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The erstwhile narrator of  Borges's dense and raveled fiction,  'Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius," concludes: 'Tlön is surely a labyrinth, but it is a labyrinth devised 
by men, a labyrinth destined to be deciphered by men."1 Labyrinth indeed! There's 
the rub, for  many men will "decipher" it (as is their wont) in many different  ways. 
Quot homines, tot sententiae.  But some won't decipher it at all. Even Borges himself 
admits that the story is one of  his best, but that it was too complex and too in-
volved to be included in his personal anthology.2 André Maurois evades the issue 
entirely by confessing  that the tale "gives food  for  endless thought,"3 but he does 
not find  it necessary to produce a single instance of  such thinking. Others believe 
it to be an innocent, simple, autobiographical tale: "Oppressed by physical reality 
and . . . the turmoil of  Europe . . . Borges sought to create a coherent fictional  world 
of  the intelligence. This world is . . . adumbrated in 'Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.' 
Tlön is no 'irresponsible figment  of  the imagination' The [final  section is] projected 
as a kind of  tentative utopia."4 At the opposite extreme, it has been perceived as 
an exemplary postmodern metafiction,5  and even as trenchant satire.6 
Borges surely knew well enough that he would stimulate such various re-
sponses: throughout the tale, he gives us glimpses of  the scholars and the media; ev-
erywhere they conjecture, quarrel, postulate new hypotheses, and disagree 
amongst themselves. Exhibit A is the narrator himself—after  all, the entire story 
(or "history") has been one that he has transmitted: he has reported every phase of 
the unfolding  of  information  and hypothecation about Tlön, and he has been a 
chief  sleuth and scholar-adventurer in this particular quest. Yet, at the close, he 
announces that he has voluntarily withdrawn, and he finally  treats the whole af-
fair  with indifference  or resignation; he has turned aside, and now translates Sir 
Thomas Browne into archaic Spanish. Even the "garden" he elects "to cultivate" 
(like Candide's) differs  from  time to time. Indeed, the very conjectured "conspiracy" 
that created Tlön in the first  place alters and changes. The original enclave 
(including Berkeley and Dalgarno) appear to consist of  disinterested scientists 
and philosophers (15). That does not prevent this secret society from  mysteriously 
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being "persecuted."7 But in the nineteenth century, an American millionaire is dif-
ferently  motivated; as an atheist at war with Christianity, he wants to ensure that 
the "movement" he now funds  will be helpful  in denigrating religion. And, in our 
own century, who can guess at the diverse motives of  modern devotees of  this cu-
rious and ill-defined  "sect"? 
Furthermore, even Tlön itself  is inconsistent. The narrator mentions "the ap-
parent contradictions" within the Eleventh Volume of  the First  Encyclopaedia  of 
Ήδη  (7). Elsewhere, we learn that one language on that planet has no nouns, but 
that in the other hemisphere, strings of  monosyllabic adjectives serve as nouns. Ev-
idently, the inhabitants are idealists and do not believe that the spacial persists in 
time, and therefore  profess  a disbelief  in objects. They reject materialism, yet 
hrönir, the duplication of  lost (even imaginary) objects, are commonplace, the pro-
duction of  such hrönir even being turned into a thriving industry. All things are 
supposedly the same on their planet, yet we learn that their world is filled  with 
"theological and metaphysical controversy" (7). Clearly, one of  Borges's seminal 
points is that man is inconsistent, changeable, and untidy. 
This fiction  itself  amply demonstrates the same disorderliness in its own form 
and content. It commences as a detective-sleuth fiction,  featuring  a quest for  a mys-
terious book, a mysterious country, and so forth.  The tale soon metamorphoses 
into the search for  an elusive planet and, on earth, an investigation into the exis-
tence of  a possible international conspiracy. Clue after  clue surfaces  or is slowly 
uncovered. Then, abruptly, in the middle of  the story, the very fictionality  and tex-
ture of  this fiction  seems to disappear, and the author becomes himself  involved in 
"explaining," expounding, and lecturing upon Tlön and Tlönic conceptions. From 
being immersed in a thriller and a whodunit, we are suddenly displaced into an 
expository article that sounds suspiciously akin to the dry discourses to be found 
in an honest-to-God Anglo-American  Cyclopaedia!  Then, the final  section of  this 
tale shifts  once more, and we find  ourselves immersed in an apocalyptic fiction: 
slowly, implacably, all of  planet Earth itself  is being conquered by, and converted 
into, the realm of  Tlön. As in the most absurd and far-fetched  of  science fiction  sto-
ries, we witness an infectious  disease from  outer space spreading until it takes 
over our own world. 
Needless to say, all of  these shifts,  from  one kind of  fiction  to another, are dis-
ruptive and provide the reader with a bumpy ride. Catherine Belsay terms such 
quixotic and protean fictions  "interrogative":8 instead of  adhering to the formula 
of  an established pattern or genre—such as the whodunit, the scholarly treatise, 
science fiction,  dystopia—this Borges text veers erratically from  one kind to an-
other without apparent rhyme or reason, casting the reader repeatedly upon un-
expected ground and unfamiliar  soil. The security of  anticipated literary cues and 
the formulae  of  familiar  passageways and our almost Pavlovian responses have 
been eliminated, leaving the reader stranded and unsure. 
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We don't know what to make of  this fictional  nonfiction,  or even what to 
make of  an existent/nonexistent Tlön. Nonetheless, there are in the story certain 
qualities about this imagined world that we seem to be invited to admire. What is 
attractive to many of  us is the lure of  the unknown, the adventure of  discovering 
"another world," even though it is an "anti-world." In addition, we are fascinated 
by and enamored of  man's power and his God-like ability to be a "creator"—the 
maker of  a new world and its civilizations. We are quite as gamesome as the 
Tlönistas,  and it is tempting for  us to "read into" this fable  the allegory of,  say, art 
and the imagination itself—themselves  often  idealistic, infinitely  creative, and 
(we like to hope) capable, as are our daydreams, of  influencing  the real world by a 
kind of  glorious wish-fulfillment  and osmosis, as if  merely dreaming something 
will make it so. Indeed, we are powerfully  attracted by the idea that our imagin-
ings can subsequently become a reality, just as the fiction  here tells of  one Jo-
hannes Valentinus Andrea, "a German theologian who, in the early seventeenth 
century, described the imaginary community of  Rosae Crucis—a community that 
others founded  later, in imitation of  what he had prefigured"  (5). 
Nevertheless, behind all of  the playfulness,  creativity, and fantasy  in this 
story, there is cause enough for  dis-ease. After  all, we are told that some mysteri-
ous "plot" is afoot  and, ominously, a world of  "fiction"  appears to become unhinged 
from  its confines,  loosened from  its moorings, until it invades and overruns the 
real world. The "idealism" of  the Tlönistas,  after  all, is "monistic," and it spreads 
like a pestilential inflammation. 
Bishop Berkeley's name is significantly  associated in this tale with the ori-
gins of  the Tlönistic movement. We should recollect that, in the real world, the 
doubts about reality originally propagated by Berkeley led, through Hume and 
Kant, to Hegel and to the German idealism in the nineteenth century. This stream 
also led to ideas of  a fatal  force  and a universal will driving man toward progress 
and perfection,  which in turn sparked the radical system of  Marx and of  many 
zealous revolutionary groups that have impinged so disastrously upon twentieth-
century history and life. 
In the tale, a heresiarch on Tlön purportedly postulates a sophism about nine 
copper coins and their existence and continuity, which would allow one to con-
ceive of  and accept the existence of  "materialism." "On Tuesday,"  he proposes, "X 
crosses a deserted  road  and  loses nine copper coins. On Thursday,  Y  finds  in the 
road  four  coins, somewhat rusted  ... On Friday,  Ζ  discovers  three coins in the road. 
On Friday,  morning, X  finds  two coins in the corridor  of  his house" (11). Accord-
ingly, the heresiarch deduces from  this information  the material existence and the 
persistence in time of  these nine coins. 
All of  this is rather hilarious nonsense. On the one hand, of  course, as al-
ready convinced pragmatists and materialists, we are predisposed to agree that 
such coins do indeed have a persistent and continuous life  of  their own, a unique 
identity. (Indeed, we believe further  that said coins are possessions, subject to 
ownership.) Therefore,  it is rather surprising to us when the heresiarch's account, 
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far  from  being very convincing, raises more questions than it puts to rest. Like 
Jonathan Swift,  Borges loves to compound ambiguities by introducing distorted 
data and faulty  mathematics. In the heresiarch's account, rain astonishingly man-
ages to rust four  coins (but only four!)  in the span of  a mere forty-eight  hours. 
(Clearly a chemical impossibility.) And what of  the other five?  How are they ex-
empted? In addition, the heresiarch's own timetable is unaccountably askew: Fri-
day afternoon  comes before  Friday morning. Furthermore, these overlapping sets 
of  time periods (Tuesday to Thursday, Tuesday to Friday afternoon,  Tuesday to 
Friday morning) are counted three times, each treated as being a distinctly differ-
ent "period." Lastly, two of  the coins show up in someone's house—clearly under-
mining the argument being propounded that the coins retain a continuous identity. 
For these last two could very well be different  coins, in which case, some of  the 
original coins are still missing (or have vanished); or (and this is the more amusing 
possibility), someone has stolen  these coins, has picked them up off  the road and 
placed them in a house. At a single stroke, the heresiarch, instead of  resolving dif-
ficulties,  generates a hotbed of  paradoxes about the nature of  existence, temporal-
ity, possession, loss, and theft. 
Back in the 1920s, the shrewd philosopher, George Santayana, mocked all 
Hegelians for  their egoism, optimism, and intransigent idealism. Indeed, Santayana 
considers the Hegelians a group of  sophists who will utilize specious logic and 
rhetoric to prove almost anything. But worse than that, he suggests that they not 
only honor obfuscating  abstractions, but they also utilize such obscurantism to 
conceal their inclination to rob and steal. Hence Santayana satirically contends 
that Hegel will even employ abstractions to condemn abstraction—anything, in 
short, to advance his curious brand of  materialism. In the midst of  this coy dia-
tribe, Santayana utilizes the example of  coins in a way strikingly similar to that 
found  in Borges's story. The philosopher's comments prove to be apt and relevant 
to the very question of  coins that we have been considering. 
"Suppose," Santayana begins, "I abstract a coin from  another man's pocket: it 
is easily proved by Hegel's logic that such an abstraction is a mere appearance. 
Coins cannot exist as coins except as pocketed and owned; at the same time they 
imply an essential tendency to pass into the pockets of  other men: for  a coin that 
could not issue from  the pocket would be a coin in name only, and not in func-
tion."10 Hence, by elaborate and fuzzy  distortion and verbiage, coins are demon-
strated to be created to be pocketed, and man, being defined  as a pocket-like ani-
mal, is thereby entitled to confiscate  coins at will. Of  course, in Santayana's 
hands, this is a wonderful  reductio  ad  absurdum.  Anyone wanting to believe such 
cryptic ratiocinations will need to possess an incredible naïveté and an over-
whelming secular faith  in modern systems of  "thought." 
Yet that is precisely the point. For it was just such naïveté that led to the great 
heretical and secular "religions" of  our own century—Hitler's National Socialism 
and Stalin's Communism—that elevate the abstract State über alles,  And it is ex-
actly such modern politics that are so important to Borges's story—important for 
their almost total  absence from  the scene! Let us recall that the key dates during the 
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story's time sequences include 1935,1940, and 1942. What has to be remarkable is 
the total absence of  any reference  to World War II, which was looming in the 
1930s and then, after  1939, raging throughout most of  Europe and Asia.11 Tlönist 
idealism not only crowds reality off  the stage, it is itself  also a species of  that self-
same reality. The same absence of  frame-of-reference  is remarkable, for  example, 
when the amoral Robinson Crusoe, keeping a diary on his desert island, merely 
records for  December 25th: "Rain all day."12 What Crusoe omits (i.e., the vacuity of 
his Christianity) tells the whole story. 
So it is in this tale of  Tlön. But, in the last section, Borges finally  makes a 
small, passing allusion to diseased modern political and military events. Tlön, he 
reports to us, and the idea of  Tlön, was appealing to all the peoples in our world; 
they were more than ready to embrace such an idealizing system, eager to accept 
and to endorse the absolutist ideals of  Tlön: "Almost immediately, reality yielded 
on more than one account. The truth is that it longed to yield. Ten years ago any 
symmetry with a semblance of  order—dialectical materialism, anti-Semitism, 
Nazism—was sufficient  to entrance the minds of  men. How could one do other 
than submit to Tlön?" (17). At this instant, the reader should be tumbled rudely to 
earth with a resounding splat:  our games and our whimsies and our fancies  of 
which fulfillment  are of  no help to us, alas—not when they lead us to Hitler and 
the Holocaust. Romantic man, yearning for  exotic systems, might have just gotten 
what he deserved—but it was decidedly more than he had bargained for! 
Ironically, Tlön commences to displace the known world; Tlön itself  becomes 
an hrönir—a terrible new reality produced by wish-fulfillment!  The progression 
in Borges's story is insidious and grotesque: the First World, Uqbar, imagines a 
fictitious  Tlön, or Second World; then Tlön supplants Uqbar entirely; now, irony 
of  ironies, this Second World has invaded our own planet, or Third World, and 
superseded i t . 1 3 The bitterest irony is that Borges's fiction  insists that planet 
Earth is slowly becoming "idealistic" because of  a steady and implacable infiltra-
tion into our world of  alien ideas from  the planet Tlön. Indeed, the Nazi and Bol-
shevik triumphs in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrate only too baldly that planet 
Earth does not need a Tlön to captivate us or to induce the spread of  dangerous 
Hegelian and Marxist concepts: we are doing very well, thank you, all by our-
selves! 
On the other hand, the whole myth concerning Tlön and its insidious beliefs 
has been a home-grown conspiracy of  our own all along—devised and promul-
gated by an invidious (if  anomalous) secret society. Either way, and regardless of 
the source, Earth is portrayed as eagerly receptive to the wildest (and most dan-
gerous) ideas and notions. In short, the worst-case scenario of  the science fiction 
imagination—that aliens and monsters might invade and take over our planet—is 
not as scary as the prospect of  our own ability to nurture and devise native-
grown ideas that will destroy us equally well. 
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At the outset of  this satiric story, Borges explains that the narrator and Bioy 
Casares had planned "the composition of  a novel in the first  person, whose narra-
tor would omit or disfigure  the facts  and indulge in various contradictions which 
would permit a few  readers—a very few  readers—to perceive an atrocious or ba-
nal reality" (3). Such fanciful  idealism that our century has indulged itself  in might 
be banal indeed, but the results it led to, our modern inheritance, has proved par-
ticularly deadly and "atrocious." Of  that there can be no doubt. 
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